Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough

Michael McFaul and Anders Åslund

 

Washington, D.C.: Carenegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006.

 

 

Keywords: Civil Society, Elite Competition, Oligarchs, Orange Revolution, Ukraine

 

A. Main Hypotheses of Relevance to PDT

 

Applicability

The authors maintain that the conditions needed for a democratic breakthrough are: “A semiautocratic regime… an unpopular leader of the ancien régime… a strong and well organized opposition… an ability to create the perception quickly that election results were falsified… enough independent media to inform citizens about the falsified vote… a political opposition capable of setting in motion tens of thousands of demonstrators to protest electoral fraud… and a division between intelligence forces, the military, and the police… external actors can facilitate the development of many of these domestic factors” (McFaul, 166).

 

Political Institutions

Executive Power

The 1996 constitutional amendment in Ukraine gave Kuchma overwhelming authority, and it was shortly after this that freedom of the press and other civil liberties began to decrease. Kuchma was unsuccessful in consolidating power completely, and this forced him to create a regime pitting different factions against each other with the president as the final arbiter (Aslund). This regime collapsed when put under pressure during the Orange Revolution.

 

There are fears that Shaakashvili is too unconstrained and that this may lead to democratic backsliding (McFaul).

 

If the executive is the overwhelming political actor and he becomes unpopular, this can lead to a major crisis and ultimately cause incumbents to lose power, as was the case with Kuchma, Shevardnadze, Akiev, and Milosevic (Karatnycky, Kuzio, McFaul).

Parties

Parties serve as a critical organizing and support-generating mechanism for the opposition. The Ukrainian opposition parties’ impressive results in the 2002 parliamentary elections were very important in organizing and mobilizing civil society around the Orange coalition. The party infrastructure, with the help of civil society, arranged a series of mass rallies. These mass rallies gave the Orange coalition the kind of important exposure that they weren’t receiving from the mass media. (Diuk).

Ethno-federalism

“The status of Kosovo, Montenegro, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia did not have to be resolved before democratic breakthrough could occur… nor did tensions between ethnic Ukrainians living in western Ukraine and ethnic Russians living in eastern Ukraine become the destabilizing, antidemocratic factor that some Ukrainian elites had hoped for” (McFaul 187).

 

Civil Society

Civil society played a fundamental if not the fundamental role in making the Orange Revolution a success. These groups got people out to vote, monitored polling stations, conducted parallel counts, and conducted independent exit polling which made falsification more difficult for the authorities. See Diuk summary below for more details.

 

Mass Mobilization

The authorities neither anticipated nor believed that the opposition would be successful in mobilizing a large number of protestors. When this did happen, many elites switched sides or stayed neutral in the political battle between Yushchenko and Yanukovich. The fact that the Yushchenko supporters who came out to protest were far more numerous and committed than the Yanukovich supporters lent Yushchenko more legitimacy (Kuzio).

 

Role of Media

The precise role of the media is difficult to discern. Prytula claims that the fact that mainstream journalists switched to reporting on the Orange Revolution was a key factor to its success, yet she also claims that “journalists and the police were the last professions to join the revolution,” three days after the initial tents went up on Maidan (119).  A modicum level of alternative media needs to be available, as was the case with Channel 5, which did cover the opposition consistently. Opposition groups used a variety of techniques in order to transmit information, including the internet, cell phones, and large television screens set up around the country to broadcast rallies that would otherwise receive no television coverage.

 

Economic and Sociological Factors

Economic liberalization

Yushchenko gained much of his popularity when he was Prime Minister by pushing through a number of reforms and privatizations, and clamping down on rent seeking. As a result, oligarchs became more production-oriented and less dependent on the state, which created a stronger base for the opposition (Aslund).

 

Development of middleclass/bourgeoisie

Economic growth created a larger middle class that became an important source of funding for the opposition and civil society (Diuk). The perception by much of the population that the authorities did not represent their interests instigated them to take political action (Kuzio).
 

“In Ukraine, recent economic growth and an expanding middle class were causes of the Orange Revolution… however, the real class drama in that breakthrough was the clash between billionaires and millionaires” (McFaul 186).

 

Clean Break vs. Gradualism

Both Kravchuk and Kuchma incorporated opposition members into the government. Yushchenko was able to institute a number of reforms when he was Prime Minister that he seems to be eager to protect as President. Moreover, he decided to negotiate with the Yanukovich faction rather than push them aside. The fact that he agreed to significantly reduce the powers of the President could be taken as an institutional clean break, but it also gives more power to the Yanukovich/Kuchma faction which is what they were negotiating for (McFaul).

 

Prior Democratic Experience/Culture

Ukraine’s well-established civil society was the deciding factor in the success of the Orange Revolution (Demes and Forbrig). On the other hand, the opposition didn’t begin to mobilize until regime abuses became flagrant with the murder of Gongadze in 2000, despite the fact that press and other freedoms had been noticeably diminishing since at least 1996.

 

Leadership

It is not clear whether the leaders of electoral revolutions were indispensable or emerged as a result of the events themselves (McFaul).

 

External Factors

“Western support for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) mattered because NGOs and independent think tanks monitored elections at several levels” (Sushko and Prystayko 127). “Ukrainian success proved only that international observation missions may be successful if national observers professionally assist foreigners” (Sushko and Prystayko 139).

 

EU

Initially there was split between the old states and new states in the EU on how to approach the issue. The former were much more cautious about supporting fair elections and the Ukrainian opposition, and were reluctant to give up on the “Russia first” policy. The later were very supportive of the opposition from the beginning. Eventually the entire EU supported a free and fair electoral process, using the carrot approach to get the authorities to comply (Sushko, Prystayko).

 

US

In contrast, the US used the stick approach, aggressively supporting a free and fair electoral process from the beginning. They threatened authorities with political and economic repercussions should they not comply with international standards. They also set aside money for Ukrainian civil society and sent over a number of prominent figures to speak about the importance of elections (Sushko and Prystayko).

 

Russia

Russia seemed to want to prove that it could act in Ukraine “as it would within its own borders” (Petrov and Ryabov 145). Russia sought to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence, “any other option was ruled out” (Petrov and Ryabov 146). As such it supported the Yanukovich candidacy through a number of financial contributions and debt write-offs, while also providing his campaign with Russian public relations experts. Massive anti-Western propaganda was encouraged by Russia, which had a major effect on Ukrainian perceptions of NATO and the EU (Sushko and Prystayko 128).

 

B.  Article Summary

 

Aslund, “The Ancien Régime: Kuchma and the Oligarchs.”

 

• Kuchma ensured his rule by playing oligarchs against each other. Many oligarchs served in the presidential administration and received state subsidies of various kinds.
• Kuchma’s hold on power began to slip when he appointed Yushchenko to be PM in response to the worsening economic situation. Yushchenko cut back subsidies and privatized state enterprises. The economy improved and Yushchenko became popular.
• Oligarchs became less dependent on rent-seeking and the state. They began to want firmer and more predictable property laws and rights.
• Oligarchs and security forces weren’t consolidated or united
• When the Orange Revolution began Kuchma could not amass a strong enough coalition to fight against it or keep elites from switching sides.

 

Karatnycky, “The Fall and Rise of Ukraine’s Political Opposition: From Kuchmagate to the Orange Revolution.”

 

·       “Ukraine’s broad-based political opposition was many years in the making,” though for most of the 1990s it was splintered (29).

·       Independent political parties did not have a strong private sector base, and after the 1996 constitutional reforms strengthening the presidency, the parliament was marginalized.

·       Opposition members were regularly included in formation of government.

·       Conflict within oligarchy and government created clear political opposition forces against the president. The death of journalist Heorhiy Gongadze and the evidence of Kuchma’s involvement served as a rallying call for student, civic, and political organizations.

·       Some violence of early demonstrations made mass mobilization more difficult.

 

 

Kuzio, “Everyday Ukrainians and the Orange Revolution.”

 

• Starting with Kuchmagate, Ukraine entered a political crisis that created and revealed “low trust in state institutions, low popularity for President Leonid Kuchma and high support for his impeachment, a growing gulf between the ruling elite and society, heightened opposition activity in the streets and in parliament, and international isolation” (45).
• “Popular perceptions of unjust privatizations and the rise of Ukrainian’s oligarchic class… economic growth was not felt by the population” (49).
• Economic stagnation generally does not lead to counter-revolutions in the CIS; Ukraine had strong economy.
• Ukrainian ruling elite was out of touch with society; society felt disenfranchised.
• Authorities conceded a narrow Yushchenko victory in the first round, motivating the opposition.
• Polls before election day showed that people were ready to protest in case of electoral fraud.
• Authorities did not think an electoral revolution was possible, believing Ukrainians to be passive, and did not plan for it. Prior protests had only attracted 25-50,000 participants.
• The ruling elites were unprepared for mass protests, causing the disintegration of the centrist camp.
• The Ukrainian movement was aided by the extensive youth mobilization and training that went on between 2000-03, anti-Kuchma protests and 2002 parliamentary elections, as well as advice from Georgian and Serbian youth groups who had experienced similar conditions.
• Modern technology and communications such as large television screens, the internet, and cell phone text messages allowed Yushchenko to rally support despite the fact that much of the media was controlled and censored by authorities.
• There was a perception among many that election was a stark choice between good and evil, between consolidated democracy and authoritarianism. Yushchenko’s image was that he was not corrupt and embraced European values while Yanukovich had two criminal records and seemed to represent the oligarchy and Russian style authoritarianism.
• “Security forces either defect[ed] or stay[ed] neutral during the 2004 elections” (57).
• The majority of Ukrainians wanted greater democratization.
• The Divide between Russophones and Ukrainophones was less pronounced due to nation-building over the past decade.
• Stakes were perceived to be high and the identity of Ukraine as a sovereign state was perceived to be at risk.

 

Diuk, “The Triumph of Civil Society.”

 

• Two years before Orange Revolution, public-opinion polling of Ukrainian and Russian youths revealed similar attitudes with no indication that “Ukranian youth would be the vanguard of activists who would launch the Orange Revolution” (69).
• “There is a correlation between the level of maturity of civil society and the level of its organization, the way public protests are conducted, and the outcome” (69). “An organized civil society often determines how quickly democratic practices are absorbed into the new political system” (70).
• “Each of the most recent transitions has been precipitated by an election where credible evidence exists (usually collected by well respected civic groups) that the government has subverted the process and that there had been widespread fraud”  (70).
• “With enough free media to inform both the local population and international community and then a well organized protest movement to bring people out onto the streets in peaceful protest, a mass protest may be launched” (70).
• A soft or semiauthoritarian state is necessary for the above factors to exist
• Cooperation or neutrality of the security forces and the municipal government of the capital city is key for electoral revolution to be successful (70).
• Think tanks, monitoring groups, were fairly widespread in Ukraine, and as media outlets became increasingly manipulated by authorities in the late 90s, civic groups began to act as information gatherers and disseminators.
• Civic groups got people out to vote, monitored polling stations, and conducted parallel counts and independent exit polling, making falsification more difficult for the authorities.
• Coalition building was common among Ukrainian civic groups in the run up to the Orange Revolution, especially after the success of the 2002 parliamentary elections.
• Although the consolidating political opposition did not initially reach out to civil society, civic groups were organizing on their own and ready to conduct electoral campaigns without much access to traditional media outlets.
• The opposition planned mass protests long in advance, believing that there would be gross falsifications. Several mass gatherings were held in the run-up to the election.
• Foreign support of civil society was important towards its effectiveness, however much of its funding was provided by the Ukrainian middle class.
• Civil society and regime did not communicate, pushing civil society into more radical action.

 

Demes, Forbrig, “Pora—‘It’s Time for Democracy in Ukraine.’” (While the general scope of this article does not relate directly to the PDT hypotheses, it provides an excellent account of the activities of Pora)

 

• “Civil society was the central driving force behind the democratic breakthroughs” (86)

 

Prytula, “The Ukrainian Media Rebellion”

 

• “The first reports of censorship under Kuchma appeared at the beginning of 1996” (104)
• Long before the presidential elections of 1999, most television stations kept blacklists of politicians whom the government ‘recommended’ not receive publicity… Strict censorship soon led to self-censorship” (104)
• “Journalists and the police were the last professions to join the revolution” (119).
• “The existence of an independent media, such as Channel 5, Zerkalo tyzhnia, and the Internet was important… the Internet provide[d] new opportunities for independent media… its main advantage is that it does not require a large investment” (120-1).
• “Usually, independent media platforms are created by well known journalists who are well aware of professional ethics and capable of defending their professional rights” (121).
• “Certain personal examples and instances of collective contributed to the [journalistic] victory” (121)
• “Corporate and public control over media activities was essential. Ukraine needs a highly developed civil society and influential public organizations that will be able to change media behavior should journalists violate professional ethics”  (121).
• “Without the capitulation of media management, the media revolution might have proved far less effective” (121).
• “The Orange Revolution was the first revolution to use modern technology and Internet to full advantage” (121).

 

Sushko, Prystayko, “Western Influence.”

 

• Many important Western figures such as Madeleine Albright, George H.W. Bush, Richard Holbrooke, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Wesley Clark visited Ukraine in the run up to the election to stress the importance of a free and fair election process.
• The West was “preoccupied with the election being conducted according to international democratic standards rather than with the identity of the victor, pretending that both candidates were committed to democracy and a market economy” (129)
• The US, EU, international election observation missions, and supporters of Ukrainian NGOs were actively promoting democracy in Ukraine long before the presidential election.
• Western participation ranged from “political declarations and financing Ukrainian NGOs to international observation missions and mediation during the November political crisis… Western public relations firms also contributed to the 2004 Ukrainian campaign… anybody who paid could use such services” (130).
• New European states were more value driven and eagerly encouraged the opposition; old European states more cautious, following Russia-first policy, more pragmatic due to their dependence on Russian energy.
• The EU sent a strong message about the illegitimacy of elections and “used carrots rather than sticks in its strategy for enhancing democracy in Ukraine,” tying future EU policy to Ukraine’s adherence to democratic principles (132)
• The US position was firm from the beginning in encouraging a fair and free election process, preferring to use the stick approach. “Nonadherence to democratic principles would lead to negative political and economic consequences for the state” (133).
• “Western donors… often found NGOs to implement their ideas. Their activities included supporting independent public opinion polls, carrying out independent exit polls, producing television spots, encouraging people to vote, publishing and distributing literature explaining people’s rights, and supporting human rights organizations in monitoring violations and prosecuting violators” (134).
• “Election observation is one of the most powerful instruments of Western influence. The OSCE mission to Ukraine was one of the largest to date” (136).
• “Ukrainian success proved only that international observation missions may be successful if national observers professionally assist foreigners” (139)

Petrov, Ryabov, “Russia’s Role in the Orange Revolution.”

• Russia seemed to want to prove that it could act in Ukraine “as it would within its own borders” (145). Russia sought to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence, “any other option was ruled out” (146).
• “Russian foreign policy has sought gradually to restore and increase Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space” (145).
• Russia attempted to further integration through Common Economic Space (CES).
•  Kremlin chose to back Kuchma’s chosen successor and refused to interact with Yushchenko.
• Russia sought to emphasize the confrontation between Western and Eastern Ukraine and the pro-Western and pro-Russian orientations.
• Many Russian public relations experts and image-makers joined Yanukovich’s campaign.
• Encouraged pressuring of state employees, pensioners, and other people dependent on the state to vote for Yanukovich.
• Large economic contributions towards Yanukovich’s campaign. Reduced Ukraine’s gas debt, abolished quotas for Ukrainian steel pipes (150).
• Gasprom and Interros supported Yanukovich. Those corporations who were prepared to support Yushchenko were blocked by the Kremlin, but some did help clandestinely by providing political consultants.

McFaul, “Conclusion: the Orange Revolution in Comparative Perspective.”

 

Similarities between Cases in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia and Ukraine

 

·       The spark for regime change in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan was a fraudulent national election

·       “The challengers to incumbents deployed extraconstitutional means to ensure that the formal rules of politics embodied in the constitution would be followed” (165).

·       “All four cases experienced dual sovereignty, in which incumbents and challengers both claimed to be the sovereign authority of the same territory” (166).

·       “All these revolutionary situations ended without a massive use of violence by either the state or opposition” (166).

 

C.  Comments

This book provides a comprehensive account of the events surrounding the Orange Revolution, and contains a number of broader lessons for the region. In particular, it shows how truly effective and representative civil societies are formed and maintained.

 

(Summarized by Artyom Matusov, 07/07/06)